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Abstract
We study the extension of dependence logic D by a majority quantifier M over finite structures.
We show that the resulting logic is equi-expressive with the extension of second-order logic by
second-order majority quantifiers of all arities. Our results imply that, from the point of view of
descriptive complexity theory, D(M) captures the complexity class counting hierarchy.
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1 Introduction
We study the extension of dependence logic D by a majority quantifier M over finite struc-
tures. Dependence logic [19] extends first-order logic by dependence atomic formulas
=(t1, . . . , tn)
the intuitive meaning of which is that the value of the term tn is completely determined by
the values of t1, . . . , tn−1. While in first-order logic the order of quantifiers solely determines
the dependence relations between variables, in dependence logic more general dependencies
between variables can be expressed. Historically dependence logic was preceded by partially
ordered quantifiers (Henkin quantifiers) of Henkin [8] and Independence-Friendly (IF) logic of
Hintikka and Sandu [9]. It is known that both IF logic and dependence logic are equivalent to
existential second-order logic ESO in expressive power. From the point of view of descriptive
complexity theory, this means that dependence logic captures the class NP.
The framework of dependence logic has turned out be flexible to allow interesting general-
izations. For example, the extensions of dependence logic in terms of so-called intuitionistic
implication and linear implication was introduced in [1]. In [23] it was shown that extending
D by the intuitionistic implication makes the logic equivalent to full second-order logic SO.
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Recently, new variants of the dependence atomic formulas have been introduced in [7]
and [6]. Also a modal version of dependence logic was introduced in [20] and has been
studied in [14] and [15]. In this paper we are concerned with introducing a new quantifier to
dependence logic: the majority quantifier. Adding majority and, more generally, counting
capabilities to logical formalisms or computational devices has deserved a lot of attention in
theoretical computer science. Understanding the power of counting is an important problem
both in logic and in computational complexity:
The circuit class TC0, the class of problems solvable by polynomial-size constant-depth
circuits with majority gates, is at the current frontier for lower bound techniques (see,
e.g., [21]). We have strict separations of classes within TC0, but above TC0 we have
essentially no lower bounds. By a diagonalization it follows that TC0 is different from the
second level of the exponential-time hierarchy and that uniform TC0 is strictly included
in the class PP of probabilistic polynomial time [2], but a separation from a lower class
seems to be far away. In particular, the question if TC0 equals NC1 (logarithmic-depth
circuits with bounded fan-in gates) is considered the P-NP problem of circuit complexity.
The counting-hierarchy (the oracle hierarchy built upon PP) can be characterized us-
ing majority quantifiers in just the same way as by Wrathall’s theorem existential and
universal quantifiers characterize the polynomial hierarchy [17].
By Toda’s theorem, one majority quantifier is as powerful as the whole polynomial hier-
archy [16].
Here we suggest a definition of a majority quantifier for dependence logic. The proposed
semantics mimics that of the existential and universal quantifiers in D. The present paper
is devoted to a first study of the resulting logic, denoted by D(M). We examine some of its
basic properties, prove strong normal forms (some of our technically most involved proofs
are found here), and show in our main result, that dependence logic with the majority
quantifier leads to a new descriptive complexity characterization of the counting hierarchy:
D(M) captures CH.
Engström [5] has also studied generalized quantifiers in dependence logic. He considered
different conservative extensions of D—informally this means that he extends D by gener-
alized quantifiers in a first-order manner. From a descriptive complexity point of view, his
logics do not lead out of NP, i.e., ESO, assuming the quantifier in question is ESO-definable
(e.g., the majority quantifier). Our approach and results differ from that of Engström since
we are in a sense extending dependence logic by a dependence majority quantifier, whose
semantics is defined in close analogy with the semantics of ∃ and ∀ in dependence logic. The
results of our paper show that our extension behaves like an extension of SO by second-order
generalized quantifiers.
This article is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we defined dependence logic and discuss
some basic results on it. Then we introduce a majority quantifier for the dependence logic
setting and discuss the basic properties of D(M). In Subsect. 2 we discuss the complexity
class counting hierarchy and the second-order majority quantifiers Mostk that have been
used to characterize it in [10]. In Sect. 3, we introduce second-order majority quantifiers
Mostkf ranging over functions and in Sect. 4 we show that, for sentences the logics SO(Mostf)
(the extension of second-order logic SO by Mostkf for k ≥ 1) and D(M) are equivalent. Due
to space restrictions, some proofs have to be omitted in this paper, but can be found in the
full version at http://arxiv.org/abs/1109.4750.
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2 Preliminaries
In this section we first define dependence logic and discuss its basic properties. Then we
define the counting hierarchy and the logic corresponding to it.
2.1 Dependence Logic
Dependence logic (D) extends the syntax of first-order logic by new dependence atomic
formulas. In this article we consider only formulas of D that are in negation normal form.
I Definition 2.1 ([19]). Let τ be a vocabulary. The τ -formulas of dependence logic (D[τ ])
is defined by extending FO[τ ], defined in terms of ∨, ∧, ¬, ∃ and ∀, by atomic dependence
formulas
=(t1, . . . , tn), (1)
where t1, . . . , tn are terms.
The meaning of the formula (1) is that the value of the term tn is functionally determined
by the values of the terms t1, . . . , tn−1. The formula =() is interpreted as >. The semantics
of D will be formally presented shortly.
I Definition 2.2. Let φ ∈ D. The set Fr(φ) of free variables of a formula φ is defined as for
first-order logic, except that we have the new case
Fr(=(t1, . . . , tn)) = Var(t1) ∪ · · · ∪Var(tn),
where Var(ti) is the set of variables occurring in term ti. If Fr(φ) = ∅, we call φ a sentence.
The semantics of D is formulated using the concept of a Team. Let A be a model with
domain A. Assignments of A are finite mappings from variables into A. The value of a term
t in an assignment s is denoted by tA〈s〉. If s is an assignment, x a variable, and a ∈ A, then
s(a/x) denotes the assignment (with domain dom(s) ∪ {x}) that agrees with s everywhere
except that it maps x to a.
I Definition 2.3. Let A be a set and {x1, . . . , xk} a finite (possibly empty) set of variables.
1. A team X of A with domain dom(X) = {x1, . . . , xk} (we call A the co-domain of X) is
any set of assignments s : {x1, . . . , xk} → A.
2. The relation rel(X) ⊆ Ak corresponding to X is defined as
rel(X) = {(s(x1), . . . , s(xk)) : s ∈ X}.
3. For a function F : X → A, we define
X(F/x) = {s(F (s)/x) : s ∈ X}
X(A/x) = {s(a/x) : s ∈ X and a ∈ A}.
We will next define the semantics of dependence logic. Below, atomic formulas and their
negations are called literals.
I Definition 2.4 ([19]). Let A be a model and X a team of A. The satisfaction relation
A |=X φ is defined as follows:
1. If φ is a first-order literal, then A |=X φ iff for all s ∈ X we have A |=s φ.
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2. A |=X=(t1, . . . , tn) iff for all s, s′ ∈ X such that
tA1 〈s〉 = tA1 〈s′〉, . . . , tAn−1〈s〉 = tAn−1〈s′〉, we have tAn 〈s〉 = tAn 〈s′〉.
3. A |=X ¬ =(t1, . . . , tn) iff X = ∅.
4. A |=X ψ ∧ φ iff A |=X ψ and A |=X φ.
5. A |=X ψ ∨ φ iff X = Y ∪ Z such that A |=Y ψ and A |=Z φ .
6. A |=X ∃xψ iff A |=X(F/x) ψ for some F : X → A.
7. A |=X ∀xψ iff A |=X(A/x) ψ.
Above, we assume that the domain of X contains the variables free in φ. Finally, a sentence
φ is true in a model A (in symbols: A |= φ) if A |={∅} φ. Above, A |=s φ denotes satisfaction
in first-order logic.
Let us then recall some basic properties of dependence logic that will be needed later. The
following lemma shows that the truth of a D-formula depends only on the interpretations of
variables occurring free in the formula. Below, for V ⊆ dom(X), X  V is defined by
X  V := {s  V | s ∈ X} and
s  V := {(a, s(a)) | a ∈ dom(s) ∩ V }.
I Lemma 2.5 ([19]). Suppose V ⊇ Fr(φ). Then A |=X φ if and only if A |=XV φ.
All formulas of dependence logic also satisfy the following strong monotonicity property
called Downward Closure.
I Proposition 2.6 ([19]). Let φ be a formula of dependence logic, A a model, and Y ⊆ X
teams. Then A |=X φ implies A |=Y φ.
On the other hand, the expressive power of sentences of D coincides with that of existential
second-order sentences:
I Theorem 2.7 ([19]). D = ESO.
Finally, we note that dependence logic is a conservative extension of first-order logic.
I Definition 2.8. A formula φ of D is called a first-order formula if it does not contain
dependence atomic formulas as subformulas.
First-order formulas of dependence logic satisfy the so-called flatness property:
I Theorem 2.9 ([19]). Let φ be a first-order formula of dependence logic. Then for all A
and X:
A |=X φ if and only if for all s ∈ X we have A |=s φ.
2.2 Dependence logic with a majority quantifier
The main topic of the present paper is the study of a logic obtained from D by the intro-
duction of a majority quantifier M. We denote this extended logic by D(M). It is formally
defined by extending the syntax and semantics of dependence logic by the following clause:
A |=X Mxφ(x) iff for at least |A||X|/2 many functions F : X → A we have A |=X(F/x) φ(x).
Analogously to D the logic D(M) has the so-called empty team property:
I Proposition 2.10. For all models A and formulas φ of D(M), it holds that A |=∅ φ.
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Proof. The claim is proved using induction on φ. J
We also observe that D(M) satisfies the downward closure property (compare to Proposition
2.6).
I Proposition 2.11. Let φ be a formula of D(M), A a model, and Y ⊆ X teams. Then
A |=X φ implies A |=Y φ.
Proof. The claim is proved using induction on φ. We consider the case where φ is Mxψ.
The other cases are proved exactly as for dependence logic (see Proposition 3.10 in [19]). By
the induction assumption, ψ satisfies the claim. Let A, X and Y be as above and suppose
that |A| = n, |X| = m, and |Y | = m− 1. Let us assume A |=X φ. Then for at least (nm)/2
many functions F : X → A it holds that A |=X(F/x) ψ. Since ψ satisfies the claim, it holds
that if A |=X(F/x) ψ, then A |=Y (F ′/x) ψ, where
F ′ = F  Y. (2)
Note that, in the worst case, at most n different functions F gives rise to the same reduct
F ′ in (2). Therefore, the number of functions F : Y → A satisfying A |=Y (F/x) ψ is at least
(nm)/2n = nm−1/2 and hence A |=Y φ. It is easy to see that the analogous argument can
be used with any Y ⊆ X. J
A well-studied property in the context of dependence logic is that of coherence, defined
as follows. A formula φ is called k-coherent if and only if for all structures A and teams X
it holds that
A |=X φ⇔ for every k-element subteam X ′ ⊆ X it holds that A |=X′ φ.
1-coherent formulas are also called flat.
I Proposition 2.12. There is a formula φ ∈ D(M) without dependence atoms such that φ
is not k-coherent for any k ∈ N.
We also note that the analogue of Proposition 2.5 does not hold for D(M).
I Proposition 2.13. The truth of a D(M)-formula φ may depend on the interpretations of
variables that do not occur free in φ.
2.3 Second-order Majority Quantifiers and the Counting Hierarchy
In this section we define the counting hierarchy and the relevant generalized quantifiers.
I Definition 2.14. Let k ≥ 1. We define the k-ary second-order generalized quantifier Mostk
binding a k-ary relation symbol X in a formula φ. Assume A is a structure with domain A
such that |A| = n. Then the semantics of this quantifier is defined as follows:
A |= MostkXφ(X) ⇐⇒ ∣∣{B ⊆ Ak | A |= φ(B)}∣∣ ≥ 2nk/2.
We will also make use of the so-called k-ary second-order Rescher quantifier, defined as
follows:
A |= RkX,Y (φ(X), ψ(Y )) ⇐⇒ ∣∣{B ⊆ Ak | A |= φ(B)}∣∣ ≥ ∣∣{B ⊆ Ak | A |= ψ(B)}∣∣.
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It is quite easy to see that the Mostk-quantifier can be defined in terms of the quantifier
Rk. In [10] it was shown that the k-ary Rescher quantifier Rk can be defined in first order
logic with Mostk+1, and, for k ≥ 2, already with Mostk. It is worth noting that in [10] the
quantifiers Mostk and Rk are interpreted as strict majority and strict inequality, respectively.
All the results of [10] that we use also hold under the "non-strict" interpretation adopted in
this article.
The counting hierarchy (CH) is the analogue of the polynomial hierarchy, defined as the
oracle hierarchy using as building block probabilistic polynomial time (the class PP) instead
of NP:
1. C0P = P,
2. Ck+1P = PPCkP,
3. CH =
⋃
k∈N CkP.
The counting hierarchy was first defined by Wagner [22] but the above equivalent formulation
is due to Torán [17]. The class PP consists of languages L for which there is a polynomial
time-bounded nondeterministic Turing machine N such that, for all inputs x, x ∈ L iff more
than half of the computations of N on input x accept.
In [10] it was shown that the extension FO(Most) of FO by the quantifiers Mostk, for
k ∈ N, describes exactly the problems in the counting hierarchy. The proof therein used the
fact that the second-order existential quantifier can be simulated by Mostk and first-order
logic.
I Theorem 2.15. FO(Most) = SO(Most) = CH.
By the above remark we see that in the previous theorem the Most quantifiers can be
replaced by Rescher quantifiers.
3 Majority over Functions
For our main result that compares second-order logic and dependence logic with majority-
quantifiers, it turns out to be helpful to consider a version of the Most-quantifier that ranges
over functions instead of relations.
I Definition 3.1. Let k ≥ 1. We define the k-ary second-order generalized quantifier Mostkf
binding a k-ary function symbol g in a formula φ. Assume A is a structure with domain A
such that |A| = n. Then
A |= Mostkf g φ(g) ⇐⇒
∣∣{f : Ak → A | A |= φ(f)}∣∣ ≥ nnk/2.
We denote by SO(Mostf) the extension of SO by the quantifiers Mostkf for all k ≥ 1. The
following elementary properties of SO(Mostf) will be useful.
I Proposition 3.2. The following equivalences hold:
1. (φ ∨Mostkf g ψ) ≡ Mostkf g (φ ∨ ψ), if g does not appear free in φ,
2. (φ ∧Mostkf g ψ) ≡ Mostkf g (φ ∧ ψ), if g does not appear free in φ.
Note that since also ¬Mostkf g ψ is equivalent to Mostkf g ¬ψ, Proposition 3.2 allows us to
transform formulas of SO(Mostf) to prenex normal form. The equivalences of Proposition
3.2 obviously hold also for the relational majority quantifiers Mostk.
The next proposition states the intuitively obvious fact that the extensions of SO by the
quantifiers Mostk or alternatively by Mostkf , for k ∈ N, are equal in expressive power.
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I Proposition 3.3. SO(Most) = SO(Mostf).
Proof. We prove the claim by an argument analogous to Theorem 3.4 in [10]. We will show
how to express the quantifier Mostkf in the logic SO(Most) implying SO(Mostf) ≤ SO(Most).
The converse inclusion is proved analogously.
Let us consider a formula of the form Mostkf gφ(g) ∈ SO(Mostf). Let A be a structure.
We may assume that A is ordered (we can existentially quantify it) and hence there is a
FO-formula δ(x, y) defining the lexicographic ordering of the set Ak+1. We can construct a
formula χ(X,Y ) which, for A1, A2 ⊆ Ak+1, defines the lexicographic ordering (A1 ≤l A2) of
k + 1-ary relations induced by δ(x, y).
It is now fairly straightforward to express Mostkf gφ(g) in the logic SO(Most). Let
G = {B ⊆ Ak+1 | B is the graph of some g and A |= φ(g)},
Gc = {B ⊆ Ak+1 | B is the graph of some g and A 6|= φ(g)}.
It now suffices to express |G| ≥ |Gc| in the logic SO(Most). For a D ⊆ Ak+1, define the set
IS(D) (the “initial segment” determined by D) by
IS(D) = {D′ ⊆ Ak+1| D′ /∈ G ∪Gc and D′ ≤l D}.
The condition |G| ≥ |Gc| can be now expressed by
∀D(|Gc ∪ IS(D)| ≥ 2nk+1/2⇒ |G ∪ IS(D)| ≥ 2nk+1/2).
It is straightforward to express this in the logic SO(Most). J
The following lemma will be needed in the proof of the next proposition.
I Lemma 3.4. Let k ≥ 1. There exists an ESO sentence χ(g), where g is k-ary, such that
for all A with domain |A| = n, χ(g) is satisfied by exactly dnnk/2e − 2nk−1 many k-ary
functions g none of which is a characteristic function of some k-ary relation.
The next proposition gives a useful normal form for sentences of the logic SO(Mostf).
I Proposition 3.5. Every sentence of SO(Mostf) is equivalent to a sentence of the form
∃h1Mostkf g1 · · ·Mostkf gl ∃h
2
θ,
where the function symbols in h1, and gi for 1 ≤ i ≤ l, are k-ary (k ≥ 3), and θ is a
universal first-order sentence.
Proof. Note that by Proposition 3.3 it suffices to show that every sentence of the logic
SO(Most) can be transformed to this form. The result in [10] shows (as pointed out in Lemma
10.5 in [11]) that, in the presence of built-in relations {<,+,×}, sentences of SO(Most) can
be assumed to have the form
Mosti1Y1 · · ·MostilYl ψ, (3)
where ψ is first-order. Furthermore, when l in (3) is fixed, we get a fragment of SO(Most)
characterizing the lth level of CH, i. e., the class ClP.
We will next show how to transform any sentence of the form (3) to the required form.
The first step is to quantify out the built-in relations {<,+,×} to get a sentence of the form
∃X<∃X+∃X×Mosti1Y1 · · ·MostilYl ψ∗. (4)
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The relations X<, X+, and X× can be axiomatized as part of ψ∗ (compare to case 2 of
Proposition 3.2). Then we modify the sentence (4) to change the arities of all the quantified
relations to some big enough k. We need only to replace all occurrences, say Yi(t1, . . . , tij ),
of the quantified relation symbols in ψ∗ by Yi(t1, . . . , tij , 0, . . . , 0). (Note that the needed
constant 0 can be defined using the linear order.) Increasing the arity of the second-order
existential quantifiers in (4) is clearly unproblematic. For the majority quantifiers Mostij ,
we note that for any structure A of cardinality n and B ⊆ Av, the number of k-ary relations
D ⊆ Ak such that
{a ∈ Av | (a, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ D} = B (5)
is 2nk−nv , which is independent of B. Furthermore, obviously the truth of ψ∗ with respect
to a tuple of k-ary relations D1, . . . , Dl+3 only depends on whether ψ∗(B1, . . . , Bl+3) holds,
where Bi is the restriction of Di defined analogously to (5). This fact allows us to increase
also the arity of the majority quantifiers without changing the meaning of the sentence (4).
Let us then show how to transform the relational quantifiers in (4) into function quanti-
fiers. We claim that it is possible to replace ψ∗(X<, X+, X×, Y1, . . . , Yl) by a formula of the
form
θ(g) ∨ (∀x(
∧
1≤i≤l
gi(x) ∈ {0, 1}) ∧ ψ′(g</X<, g+/X+, g×/X×, g1/Y1, . . . , gl/Yl)), (6)
where g = (g<, g+, g×, g1, . . . , gl), the new function symbols are all k-ary and ψ′ is obtained
from ψ∗ by substituting subformulas Z(t1, . . . , tk) by the corresponding g(.)(11, . . . , tk) = 1,
where Z ∈ {Y1, . . . , Yl, X<, X+, X×}.
The formula θ(g) is a ESO-formula that accepts certain dummy functions in order to
shift the border of acceptance from (2|A|k)/2 (half of k-ary relations) to |A||A|k/2 (half of
k-ary functions). The logical form of θ is
χ(g1) ∨ χ(g2) ∨ · · · ∨ χ(gl),
where χ(g) is defined in Lemma 3.4. Note that we repeatedly use case 1 of Lemma 3.2 to
gather all the formulas χ(gi) into θ which is placed after the block of all majority quantifiers.
To prove the claim we finally transform the formula (6) into Skolem normal form to get
a sentence of the form
∃g<∃g+∃g×Mostkf g1 · · ·Mostkf gl ∃gψ′, (7)
where ψ′ is a universal FO-sentence. J
4 SO(Most) = D(M)
In this section we show that the logics SO(Mostf) (and thus, by the previous section,
SO(Most)) and D(M) are equivalent with respect to sentences.
We will first show a compositional translation mapping formulas of D(M) into sentences
of SO(Mostf). This translation is analogous to the translation from D into ESO of [19].
I Lemma 4.1. Let τ be a vocabulary. For every D(M)[τ ]-formula φ there is a τ ∪ {S}-
sentence ψ of SO(Mostf) such that for all models A and teams X with dom(X) = Fr(φ) it
holds that
A |=X φ ⇐⇒ (A, rel(X)) |= ψ.
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Proof. For technical reasons to be motived shortly, we will actually prove a slightly more
general result showing that for every D(M)[τ ]-formula φ and every finite set of variables
{y1, . . . , yn} ⊇ Fr(φ) there is a SO(Mostf)[τ ∪ S]-sentence ψ such that for all A and teams
X with dom(X) = {y1, . . . , yn} it holds that
A |=X φ ⇐⇒ (A, rel(X)) |= ψ.
We will prove the claim using induction on the structure of D(M)-formulas. In the following
we write φ(y1, . . . , yn) to mean that Fr(φ) ⊆ {y1, . . . , yn}. The quantifiers Rk can be uni-
formly defined in the logic SO(Most), hence by the results of the previous section, also in
SO(Mostf). Therefore, we may freely use the quantifiers Rk in the translation.
Atomic formulas and their negations are translated exactly in the same way as in the
analogous translation from D into ESO in [19]. The cases γ := ∃ynφ(y1, . . . , yn) and γ :=
∀ynφ(y1, . . . , yn) are also translated as in [19]. Suppose then that γ := (φ ∨ ψ)(y1, . . . , yn)
and that φ∗(S) and ψ∗(S) already exist by induction hypothesis. We translate γ as follows:
γ∗(S) := ∃Y ∃Z(φ∗(Y/S) ∧ ψ∗(Z/S) ∧ ∀y1 . . . ∀yn(S(y)→ R(y) ∨ T (y))). (8)
Note that γ∗(S) is defined as in [19]. The only difference is that in the case of dependence
logic the sentence (8) can be written using a single sentence φ∗(S) (and ψ∗(S)) that translates
φ over teams with domain Fr(φ) (see Proposition 2.5). In the case of D(M) the behavior
of φ and ψ over teams X with dom(X) = {y1, . . . , yn} does not in general reduce to their
behavior over X  Fr(φ) and X  Fr(ψ) (see Proposition 2.13). Therefore, to formulate the
sentence (8), we need sentences φ∗(S) and ψ∗(S) that are correct translations of φ and ψ
with respect to teams with domain {y1, . . . , yn}.
The case γ := (φ ∧ ψ)(y1, . . . , yn) is also analogous to [19]. It remains to consider the
case where our formula γ is of the form
γ := Mynφ(y1, . . . , yn) (9)
and φ is a formula for which we have already a translation into an SO(Mostf)[τ ∪S] sentence
φ∗(S). We claim that γ can be translated as follows:
γ∗(S) := Rn Y, Z(θ1(Y ), θ2(Z)) (10)
where
θ1(Y ) := φ∗(Y/S) ∧ ∀y1 . . . ∀yn−1∃=1ynY (y) ∧ ∀y1 . . . ∀yn−1(∃ynY (y)↔ S(y′))
θ2(Z) := ¬φ∗(Z/S) ∧ ∀y1 . . . ∀yn−1∃=1ynZ(y) ∧ ∀y1 . . . ∀yn−1(∃ynZ(y)↔ S(y′))
and y′ := y1, . . . , yn−1
The following equivalence is now obvious for all A and X:
A |=X γ ⇔ (A, rel(X)) |= γ∗(S).
J
Next we will show that, for sentences, Lemma 4.1 can be reversed.
I Lemma 4.2. Let τ be a vocabulary and φ ∈ SO(Mostf)[τ ]. Then there is a sentence
ψ ∈ D(M)[τ ] such that for all models A:
A |= φ ⇐⇒ A |= ψ.
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Proof. By Proposition 3.5 we may assume that φ is of the form:
∃h1Mostkf g1 · · ·Mostkf gn ∃h
2∀x1 · · · ∀xmψ, (11)
where the function symbols in h1 and g1, . . . , gn are k-ary, and ψ is quantifier free. Before
translating this sentence into D(M), we will first apply certain reductions to it. First of
all, we make sure that the functions gi have only occurrences of the form gi(x) in ψ where
x = (x1, . . . , xk). We can achieve this by existentially quantifying new names fi for these
symbols and passing on to the sentence
∃h1Mostkf g1 · · ·Mostkf gn ∃h
2∃f1 · · · ∃fn∀x1 · · · ∀xm(
∧
1≤j≤n
gj(x) = fj(x) ∧ ψ∗), (12)
where ψ∗ is obtained from ψ by replacing all occurrences of gi by fi for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Analog-
ously, we may also assume that the functions h in h1 have only occurrences h(x1, . . . , xk) in
ψ. Here m can always be made at least k.
The next step is to transform the quantifier-free part ψ∗ to satisfy the condition that for
each of the function symbols h in h2 (also fi) there is a unique tuple x of pairwise distinct
variables such that all occurrences of it in ψ∗ are of the form h(x) (fi(x)). In order to achieve
this, we might have to introduce new existentially quantified functions and also universal
first-order quantifiers (see Theorem 6.15 in [19]), but the quantifier structure of the sentence
(11) does not change.
We will now assume that the sentence (11) has the properties discussed above:
1. The function symbols h ∈ h1 and gi have only occurrences of the form h(x1, . . . , xk) and
gi(x1, . . . , xk) in ψ, respectively.
2. For each h in h2 (fi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n) there is a unique tuple x of pairwise distinct variables
such that all occurrences of h in ψ∗ are of the form h(x) (fi(x)).
We will now show how the sentence (11) can be translated into D(M). For the sake of
bookkeeping, we assume that h1 = h1 . . . hp, h
2 = hp+1 . . . hr, and that hi appears in ψ only
as hi(xi). We claim now that the following sentence of D(M) is a correct translation for
(11):
∀x1 · · · ∀xk∃y1 · · · ∃ypMz1 · · ·Mzn∀xk+1 · · · ∀xm∃yp+1 · · · ∃yr(
∧
p+1≤j≤r
=(xi, yi) ∧ θ), (13)
where θ is obtained from ψ by replacing all occurrences of the term gi(x1, . . . , xk) by the
variable zi and, similarly, each occurrence of hi(xi) by yi.
Let us then show that the sentence φ (see (11)) and sentence (13) are logically equivalent.
Let A be a structure and let h1, . . . ,hr and g1, . . . ,gn interpret the corresponding function
symbols. We will show that the following holds:
(A,h,g) |=X ψ ⇔ A |=X∗ θ, (14)
where X = {∅}(A/x1) · · · (A/xm) and
X∗ = {∅}(A/x1) · · · (A/xk) (H1/y1) · · · (Hp/yp)
(G1/z1) · · · (Gn/zn) (A/xk+1) · · · (A/xm)
(Hp+1/y1) · · · (Hr/yr),
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where the supplement functions Hi and Gi are defined using the functions hi and gi as
follows:
Hi(s) = hi(s(x1), . . . , s(xk)) for 1 ≤ i ≤ p,
Hi(s) = hi(s(xi)) for p+ 1 ≤ i ≤ r,
Gi(s) = gi(s(x1), . . . , s(xk)) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
and where s(xi) is the tuple obtained by pointwise application of s. The claim in (14) is
now proved using induction on the structure of the quantifier-free formula ψ. Note that
ψ is a first-order formula of dependence logic; hence, by Theorem 2.9, (14) holds iff the
equivalence holds for each s ∈ X (equivalently s ∈ X∗ since the values of the universally
quantified variables functionally determine the values of all the other variables) individually.
We can now show, using induction on the construction of ψ, that for all s ∈ X∗ it holds
that
A |=s θ ⇐⇒ (A,h,g) |=s′ ψ, (15)
where s′ = s  {x1, . . . , xm}. The key to this result is the fact that, for every s, the
interpretation of the variables zi and yi agree with the interpretation of the terms hi(xi)
and g(x1, . . . , xk), respectively.
Finally, we note that there is a one-to-one correspondence between all possible inter-
pretations h1, . . . ,hr and g1, . . . ,gn for the function symbols and teams X∗ satisfying the
dependence atomic formulas in (13). Therefore, sentence φ (see (11)) and sentence (13) are
logically equivalent. J
5 Conclusion and Open Questions
We have seen that extending dependence logic by a majority quantifier increases the ex-
pressive power of dependence logic considerably. One particular consequence of our result
is that D(M) is closed under classical negation on the level of sentences. Note further that,
for open formulas, this does not hold because of the downward closure property of formulas.
Several open questions remain and we now discuss some of them. Firstly, Proposition
2.12 shows that the fragment of D(M) without dependence atoms does not satisfy the flatness
property. It would be interesting to pin down the exact expressive power of sentences of
D(M) without dependence atoms.
The second open question concerns the open formulas of D(M). In [12] it was shown
that the open formulas of D correspond to the downwards monotone properties of NP (see
[12] for the exact formulation). We conjecture that the open formulas of D(M) correspond
in an analogous manner to the downwards monotone properties of CH.
The majority quantifier is only one particular example of so-called generalized quanti-
fiers (or, Lindström quantifiers), introduced in [13] and studied extensively in the context
of descriptive complexity theory (see surveys [18] and [4]). In [3], second-order Lindström
quantifiers were introduced and some results concerning their expressive power were ob-
tained. We consider it an interesting study to enrich in a similar way dependence logic by
further generalized quantifiers and relate the obtained logics to those studied in [3].
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